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THE PROTECTION OF ARCHITECTURAL PLANS
AS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The architect, no less than the author, composer, or inventor, ap-
plies creative intellect to bring into existence new ideas and to formu-
late new combinations of existing ideas. The architect, however, does
not enjoy the same breadth of protection against appropriation of his
product available to certain other producers of original work. This
seeming inconsistency is unfortunate because very often the architect
has both economic and professional interests in seeing that his unique
designs are not appropriated by others without some form of compen-
sation and/or regulation.
At present, there appear to be five remedies of potential utilization
for the protection of architectural designs from misappropriation.
These include: (1) contractual provisions inserted in the architect-
client agreement defining the rights of the parties to the contract; (2)
the doctrine of common law copyright; (3) the federal Copyright Act;'
(4) the Patent Act;2 and (5) the doctrine of unfair competition. The
purpose of this Comment will be to highlight the various interests which
the architect may seek to protect and to discuss the above-mentioned
potential remedies, noting their practical as well as legal limitations.
INTERESTS TO BE PROTECTED
Despite the multitude of business situations involving transactions
with respect to the acquisition and use of architectural plans and de-
signs, it is possible to categorize any given situation within one of three
general categories: (1) the monumental project; (2) the client-related
project; and (3) the merchant-builder situation. While in each of these
categories the architect is interested in protecting himself against the un-
regulated and/or uncompensated appropriation of his product, the ulti-
mate focal points of that interest will differ depending upon the proj-
ect category involved.
The monumental project normally involves a major undertaking, un-
derstood by the parties involved to be "one of a kind" in nature. This
may encompass such works as major public buildings, government of-
1. 17 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq. (1970).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq. (1970).
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fices, museums, concert halls, etc. Typically, as between the architect
and the client, such a situation involves no problem of multiple use
of the plans since the architectural design per se will be used only once.
The architect is nevertheless likely to have certain other interests he
may wish to protect. He naturally has an interest in being compensated
for the initial use of his plans and design. He may have a continuing in-
terest in maintaining the integrity of that design and preventing others
from corrupting it. Even after the project has been completed, there
may exist valuable property rights in such things as the publication of
descriptive pamphlets, models and other such "residuals" which carry
the possibility of commercial exploitation. Finally, it is very possible
that the architect (as well as the client) may have an interest in pre-
venting the commercial exploitation of the popularity of the original
through a proliferation of "cheap copies."
The client-related project typically involves situations in which the
architect is retained to design and draft plans for a client's home or
place of business. The architect doing work in this area is apt to feel
that his main "stock in trade" lies in his unique design approach. He
will want to protect the uniqueness of that approach by insuring that
neither the client nor a third party reproduces its unique essentials in
the construction of other buildings without first compensating its creator.
In the merchant-builder situation, it is known in advance that the
design will be repeated many times. Often in such situations, the ar-
chitect himself will retain the rights to the design and want to assure
himself that it cannot be used by his client or a third party without pay-
ment of a royalty. In such a case, the merchant-builder assumes the
position of an exclusive licensee having no property right in the de-
sign itself. In some instances, however, the merchant-builder may ac-
tually acquire the rights to the design. In either event, whether he is
a mere licensee or owns the actual rights in the design itself, the mer-
chant-builder's interests are much the same as those of the architect
who himself retains the rights to his design. Namely, he desires the
right to prevent others from copying the design and constructing and
selling products based thereon in competition with him.
The remedies discussed in this Comment would likely find their
principal application in business situations involving projects of either
the client-related or merchant-builder types. In the area of the mon-
umental project, it is, of course, clear that the architect has a right to
be compensated for the acceptance and use of submitted plans unless
[Vol. 6
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he has expressly contracted otherwise.3 Aside from this, however, there
exists little law dealing with questions concerning rights which arise
and interests sought to be protected in the monumental project situa-
tion. The lack of judicial declarations in this area results primarily from
the comparative lack of such projects and the fact that the architects in-
volved have apparently reconciled themselves to accepting an agreed
upon fee and a right to supervise construction for the purpose of pre-
serving the artistic integrity of their design 4 as sole consideration for
their efforts. Thus, while the remedies suggested in this paper
are theoretically of equal applicability to each of the three categories
described, it is unlikely that they would find substantial actual applica-
tion in the monumental project area due mainly to the lack of judi-
cial opportunity for such application.
POTENTIAL REMEDIES FOR MISAPPROPRIATION
1. Contractual Provisions
In the absence of contractual provisions to the contrary, an architect's
client acquires all rights in and title to the architectural plans and
specifications themselves, as well as the design embodied therein.5 While
3. See especially, Ketcham v. New York World's Fair 1939, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 657,
659 (E.D.N.Y. 1940), af 'd, 119 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1940) recognizing that:
[I]t is the law that one who has worked out an embodiment of a design for a work
of art or plans for a large building program possesses a property right in his origi-
nal production.
But see Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 132 N.Y. 264, 267-68, 30 N.E. 506,
507 (1892), for the proposition that it is up to the originator of such a design to
himself protect it from disclosure, and that if it is revealed to another in the course
of negotiation, the originator has no cause of action for its value.
4. The right to protect the artistic integrity of one's design falls within the "moral
rights" doctrine as recognized in Europe and recently achieving recognition in the
United States. For a discussion of the history and development of the "doctrine," see
M. NIMMER, NiMMER ON COPYI GHT § 110 (M. Bender ed. 1963, Supp. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as NudimER]. In essence, the doctrine provides that the author
should have the right, during his lifetime, to claim authorship of the work and to
object to any distortion, mutilation or other alteration thereof, or any other action in
relation to his work which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation. Inter-
national Union For the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, signed at Berne,
Switzerland, September 9, 1886, as revised at Brussels, June 26, 1948 (customarily
referred to as the Berne Convention) at Article 6bis, contained in NIMMER, supra,
at Appendix 0. See also NIMmER, supra, § 110.3. The doctrine is not fully accepted in
all American jurisdictions. NIMmER, supra, § 110.2. It should nevertheless be argued
in a case involving "cheap copies" of a monumental project. See generally Katz, The
Doctrine of Moral Right and American Copyright Law-A Proposal, 24 S. CAL.
L. REv. 375 (1951).
5. 6 C.J.S. Architects § 10 (1958); J.J. Henry Co. v. United States, 411 F.2d 1246
(U.S. Ct. Cl. 1969).
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most architectural contracts include provisions whereby the architect
retains ownership in the plans and specifications, 6 such provisions only
partially avoid the above result. This mere partial avoidance stems
from the fact that the standard provisions do not extend beyond own-
ership of the plans and specifications to encompass rights in the design
itself.7 The plans and the design constitute two distinct entities each
of which must be protected separately. The design is the creative
concept manifested in the completed structure, while the plans are
merely one method of describing that design. It is thus possible to re-
produce a design by copying the completed building without any
assistance from the original plans themselves. Under the standard clause,
therefore, a client charged with a breach of contract through mis-
appropriation and second use could defend by asserting he copied the
building only and not the specific plans.
While all of the reasons for the above described limitation in the
standard contractual provisions are not completely clear, two may be
readily suggested. First, the draftsmen may have wished to avoid the
drafting difficulties inherent in attempting to delineate and define the
exact features of an architectural design and to circumscribe the limits of
possible ownership therein. Second, such contracts are normally subject
to hard bargaining between knowledgeable parties and any vagueness re-
sulting from an attempted extension of such provisions to encompass
the architectural design could be considered unacceptable by clients
fearful of overreaching on the part of the architect, as well as possible
subsequent exposure to costly and technical litigation.
Of course, the most severe limitation on the use of contractual pro-
visions to provide a basis for remedies for misappropriation of the ar-
chitect's product is that their applicability, and therefore their effective-
ness, is limited to the parties to the contract.8  Since the architect and
6. See, e.g., the provision excerpted from the American Institute of Architects
Standard Form Contract in note 7 infra. Architects who are members of the Ameri-
can Institute of Architects will ordinarily use one of the standard A.I.A. contracts or
suitably adapt one to suit the special needs of their practice.
7. The American Institute of Architects publishes three standard form contracts
entitled "Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Architect" differing only
in the form of remuneration specified. See, e.g., A.I.A. Documents B131, B231, and
B331, all April, 1970 Editions. All three contain the following clause:
Article 9-Ownership of Documents
Drawings and Specifications as instruments of service are and shall remain the
property of the Architect whether the Project for which they are made is executed
or not. They are not to be used by the Owner on other projects or extensions to
this project except by agreement in writing and with appropriate compensation to
the Architect.
8. See generally, 17 AM. JuiR. 2d Contracts § 294 (1965): "As a general thing, the
obligation of contracts is limited to the parties making them, and, ordinarily, only those
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his client cannot by agreement bind third parties, such protection as
is afforded by virtue of the instrument is completely ineffectual against
third parties who misappropriate the plans and specifications, the design,
or both.
2. Common Law Copyright
Even prior to the adoption of a federal copyright statute,9 there ex-
isted the English common law concept that the creator of a literary or
artistic work had, prior to publication, certain rights in his product.10
These rights continue to exist today and, although now guaranteed by
statute in many jurisdictions,"- they are still generally referred to as
''common law copyright."
In general, the author of an unpublished work has the exclusive
right to its initial publication as well as the right to prevent anyone else
from using or profiting from it prior to publication.' 2 To qualify for
this protection afforded by the common law copyright concept, it is
essential that an idea be reduced to a tangible form since there is no
protection afforded mere ideas, either before or after publication.' 3  In
addition, the tangible form must be original.' 4 Originality, in this con-
text, merely requires that the creator not have copied the work.' 5 Thus,
a creation can be identical to someone else's prior work and the creator
still obtain protection as long as he arrived at his creation independ-
ently.1
6
The protection of common law copyright, however, vanishes upon
publication.' 7 Any rights the creator may have will then terminate un-
who are parties to contracts are liable for their breach"; 17A CJ.S. Contracts § 520
(1963).
9. The first federal copyright statute was enacted in 1790. Act of May 31, 1790,
ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. The current statute is the federal Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
§ I et. seq. (1970).
10. See NIMMER, supra note 4, at §§ 1, 11.
11. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 980-983 (West 1971).
12. CAL. CIV. CODE § 980 (West 1971); Estate of Hemingway v. Random
House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 244 N.E.2d 250 (1968).
13. See NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 11.1; White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v.
Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908); Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532 (1872). The advent
of easily made tape recordings has caused reconsideration of this rule regarding ideas
expressed orally. See, e.g., Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d
341, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 244 N.E.2d 250 (1968).
14. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
15. See Amsterdam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 189 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1951).
16. Id.
17. CAL. CIV. CODE § 983 (West 1971); NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 46;
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
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less replaced with the statutory rights granted by the federal Copy-
right Act. 8 Such fights normally arise only upon publication.'" The
concept of publication is thus crucial to both common law and federal
statutory copyright. That concept, however, under common law copy-
right is vastly different from the concept of publication under the fed-
eral Copyright Act. In the common law copyright context, any act
which evidences the proprietor's intention to dedicate the work to gen-
eral use by the public constitutes its publication.20  In contrast, publi-
cation as contemplated in the federal Copyright Act is a formalistic
event necessary to obtain the statutory protections and is rigorously
defined by the statute itself.2 Clearly, it is possible to have one kind
of publication without the other.
Since the rights guaranteed by common law copyright are based on
the common law or, in some jurisdictions, a state statute, they are gen-
erally enforced in state rather than federal courts.22 In the literary and
artistic fields, the courts have generally preferred to adopt a con-
struction of the concept of publication which favors the creator over
those who would exploit his work without authorization.28 Under
such judicial interpretation, it is recognized, for example, that
performance of a dramatic production is not a publication of the script
or stage direction.24 Therefore, the author of a play may cause it to
be performed again and again without a publication taking place and
his common law copyright may thus be of perpetual duration. Of
18. See text accompanying notes 77-83 infra.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1970).
20. See NIMMER, supra note 4, at § 46; White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744 (9th
Cir. 1952).
21. See text accompanying notes 78-83 infra. See generally, Uneeda Doll Co. v. Gold-
farb Novelty Co., 373 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. dismissed, 389 U.S. 801 (1967);
Sieff v. Continental Auto Supply, 39 F. Supp. 683 (D. Minn. 1941).
22. Rights granted under statutory copyright are enforced according to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a) (1970) which provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under
any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . [and] copyrights. Such juris-
diction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent and copyright cases.
Common law copyright, not being granted by Act of Congress, does not come within
this clause and therefore can be enforced in state courts.
23. See, e.g., American Visuals Corp. v. Holland, 239 F.2d 740 (2nd Cir. 1956).
Courts adopt this construction because the penalty for publications which do not qualify
for federal statutory copyright is the irrevocable "dedication" of the work to the public.
NiMMER, supra note 4, at § 82. See also, National Comics Publications v. Fawcett Pub-
lications, 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951); Irving J. Dorfman Co. v. Borlan Industries,
Inc., 309 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.NY. 1969); Klasmer v. Baltimore Football, Inc., 200 F.
Supp. 255 (D. Md. 1961).
24. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912).
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course, he must publish the script to enable the actors in the play to
learn their parts and to enable the play itself to be produced. This,
however, is considered a "limited" publication, limited both as to
the persons to whom and the purposes for which it is made. Such a
limited publication is held not to divest the author of his common law
rights as would a "general" publication.
25
If the courts were to hold construction of a building to be analogous
to the performance of a play, the architect would be protected in per-
petuity. Use of the plans in the construction would merely constitute
a limited publication. However, the law has traditionally taken a
harsher view with respect to architectural plans and, until recently,
virtually all authority held that various ordinary activities basic to the
utilization of such plans resulted in publication. For example, in Kurfiss
v. Cowherd26 and Gendell v. Orr27 it was held that publication of the
plans occurred whenever a building was constructed from them and
placed on public view. 2' An early New York case took a still harsher
view. In Wright v. Eisle,29 plans for the construction of a house were
held to be published upon their being filed with the local building de-
partment,30 notwithstanding the fact that such filing was a prerequi-
site to the attainment of a building permit.3 1
If the above views uniformly prevailed today,32 common law copy-
right would be virtually non-existent as a remedy for the protection
of architectural plans, because publication would always be deemed
to occur prior to the time when protection would be most needed,
namely, subsequent to any initial use of the plans. Fortunately for
architects and builders, however, there have been recent and substan-
tial departures from these views in a number of significant cases. In
the leading case of Smith v. Paul3 a California court of appeal
reviewed a suit by an architect against a builder who had constructed
25. White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1952); Werckmeister v.
American Lithographic Co., 134 F. 321, 324 (2d Cir. 1904).
26. 121 S.W.2d 282 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938).
27. 13 Phila. 191 (Pa. Common Pleas 1879).
28. Kurfiss v. Cowherd, 121 S.W.2d 282, 288 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938); Gendell v.
Orr, 13 Phila. 191, 192 (Pa. Common Pleas 1879).
29. 83 N.Y.S. 887 (App. Div. 1903).
30. Id. at 889.
31. Id.
32. For recent cases upholding the Kurfiss and Gendell views see Tumey v. Little,
186 N.Y.S.2d 94 (Sup. Ct. 1959) and DeSilva Construction Corp. v. Herrald, 213
F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Fla. 1962); see contra Shaw v. Wiliamsville Manor, Inc., 330
N.Y.S.2d 623 (App. Div. 1972).
33. 174 Cal. App. 2d 744, 345 P.2d 546 (1959).
1973]
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an unauthorized house from plans prepared by the architect. The
court considered the Kurfiss, Gendell and Wright cases and con-
cluded that they had been erroneously decided. 34 With respect to the
holding in Wright, the court stated that the filing of plans with a munic-
ipal building department should be at most a "limited publication",3 5
because the municipality ought to make such plans available only for
purposes relevant to the intent of the filing requirement, namely, to as-
sure compliance with the housing and building codes.30  The
court noted that the Los Angeles ordinance which provided for
the filing of such plans expressly excluded them from the category of
public records and from unlimited public examination. 37  With respect
to the Kurfiss and Gendell holdings, the Smith court concluded that a
completed structure is no more a copy of the plans than the exhibition
of an uncopyrighted motion picture is a copy of the film or the perfor-
mance of an uncopyrighted radio script a copy of the script. 38  Noting
that neither of these types of performances are held to constitute publica-
tions of the underlying material, 9 the court held that construction of
the house did not constitute a general publication of the plans.40
The factual circumstances in Smith were singularly well-suited to
engender this result. The plans were for a custom home for a single
client, there was no promotional effort associated with the construc-
tion and sale, and, by express provision in the architect-client contract,
the architect retained all rights in the plans except for the limited use
necessary for construction of the house. 41 In short, aside from the
filing of the plans with the municipal building department and the ac-
tual construction of the house itself, there was nothing which could
be said to evidence an intent on the part of the architect to "dedicate the
work to general use by the public" 42 and to thereby constitute publi-
cation.
Smith was the principal authority relied upon by a Massachusetts
court in the case of Edgar H. Wood Associates, Inc. v. Skene.43 The
34. Id. at 758, 345 P.2d at 555.
35. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
36. 174 Cal. App. 2d at 751-752, 345 P.2d at 551.
37. Los ANGELES CAL. Crry BUILDING CODE § 91.0211(f) (1952). 174 Cal. App. 2d
at 752, 345 P.2d at 551.
38. 174 Cal. App. 2d at 755-56, 345 P.2d at 553.
39. Id.; cf. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912).
40. 174 Cal. App. 2d at 758, 345 P.2d at 555.
41. Id. at 756, 345 P.2d at 554.
42. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
43. 197 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1964).
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Wood court not only affirmed the reasoning of Smith but extended it
to encompass a fact situation involving the plans and design of an apart-
ment building, notwithstanding the fact that buildings of this type are
ordinarily put on display and thus exposed to inspection by a substan-
tial segment of the general public, namely, the general class of poten-
tial tenants. 44  In Wood, as in Smith, the architect retained all rights
in his plans, merely licensing the client to use the plans in the construc-
tion of the particular building.45 In finding a cause of action against
another builder who had obtained a set of plans from a subcontractor
of the architect's client and who then proceeded to erect a nearly iden-
tical building in an adjacent town, the court held neither the filing of the
plans with the municipal building department nor the construction
and display of the building constituted a general publication.46 The
court further stated that the structure itself did not constitute a copy of
the plans, but was only a result of their use.4 7  Therefore, no matter
how widespread the exposure to public view, there could be no publica-
tion of the plans from the construction of the building itself.48 Such
a conclusion, however, raised a logical problem. If the building itself
is not a copy of the plans but has its own independent existence,
then the building itself is not protected by the common law copy-
right. It thus follows, and the court so noted, that there is no infringe-
ment of a common law copyright by a person who makes a new set of
plans by copying the structure itself through the observation and
measurement of its interior and exterior.49 Thus, it is only the use of
the plans themselves which constitutes an infringement. This may be
considered analogous to the interpretation that there is no copyright in
the performance of a copyrighted work such as the musical performance
of a copyrighted score. 50
44. Id. at 888-89.
45. Id. at 888.
46. Id. at 893, 895.
47. Id. at 895, quoting Katz, Copyright Protection of Architectural Plans, Drawings,
and Designs, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 224, 236 (1954).
48. Id. at 893, quoting Smith v. Paul, 174 Cal. App. 2d 744, 345 P.2d 546 (1959).
49. Id. at 895.
50. Although Chapter 1, § 1 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(d)-(e) (1970),
gives the copyright proprietor the exclusive right to perform a copyrighted drama or a
copyrighted musical composition, this right is limited to a performance based upon the
copyrighted embodiment, i.e., the script or score. If the actors in a play memorize
the copyrighted script, there is authority that they may then perform the play without
authority from the owner of the copyright; see Shook v. Rankin, 21 F. Cas. 1337 (No.
12,805) (C.C.D. Minn. 1875). Closer to home are holdings that the copyright
owner does not have an exclusive right to mechanical reproduction (i.e., recording)
of the performance of his play or music even though a royalty of 20 per copy is due
19733
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In 1964, the California courts had the opportunity to reassess the
scope of the holding in Smith. The case in which this opportunity
arose, however, presented a fact situation involving conduct on the part
of the creating architect so diametrically opposed to that of his counter-
part in Smith that a finding of publication seemed almost compelled.
In Shanahan v. Macco Construction Co.,"' the plaintiff, relying on
Smith, attempted to recover damages from the defendant for use of
his floor plans in defendant's tract home developments. 2  The court
refused to apply the reasoning of Smith, distinguishing that case
and limiting the holding narrowly to its facts. 3  In Shanahan both
parties to the suit were major merchant-builders in Southern California.
The plaintiff had used the plans in question to build 1,435 homes,
almost all of which had been sold at the time of trial. Further, he
had distributed 30,000 brochures containing the floor plans and ele-
vations, invited the general public to visit his model homes-an invi-
tation which was accepted by 60,000 persons, entered the plans in a
contest and allowed them to be included in an issue of a magazine with
a circulation in excess of 100,000, made available in his tract offices
detailed plans with no supervision or restriction on use for per-
sons to examine in detail and copy dimensions from, given permission
to another builder, not a party, to build from his plans, and, lastly, had
250 sets of detailed plans made of which only three could be accounted
for at the time of trial.54 The court held that these actions on the part
of the builder evidenced an intent to surrender all common law copy-
right to the plans and thus constituted a voluntary publication." More-
him under 17 U.S.C. § 1 (e). Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Foullon, 79 F. Supp.
664, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), afj'd, 171 F.2d 905 (1949). See also, Metropolitan Opera
Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recording Co., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), af'd,
107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (App. Div. 1951) (no copyright protection in the broadcast perform-
ances so plaintiff compelled to turn to state unfair competition remedies for the unau-
thorized recording for profit of his broadcasts). Only in 1971 was the federal Copy-
right Act amended to give copyright protection to sound recordings. Act of October
15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 1(a), 85 Stat. 391, amending 17 U.S.C. § l(f).
51. 224 Cal. App. 2d 327, 36 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1964).
52. Id. at 329, 335, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 584-85, 588.
53. Id. at 336-38, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 589-90.
54. Id. at 330-32, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 585-86.
55. Id. at 339, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 590. Compare NUCOR Corporation v. Ten-
nessee Forging Steel Service, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 1305, 1308-09 (W.D. Ark. 1972),
wherein it was held that the totality of the evidence taken as a whole compelled the con-
clusion that plaintiff had no intention of claiming any copyright, common-law or statu-
tory, prior to the suit and that a general publication of the plan was made by
(1) the unrestricted distribution of 30 sets of plans to bidders on the construction of
the building, (2) permitting all interested persons to see, visit and inspect the building
during construction and while in operation after completion, (3) the publishing of
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over, with respect to the exteriors of the homes, the court erroneously
interpreted Smith as having approved the view56 that plans of exteriors
are published upon construction because of the attendant exposure to
passersby.
5 7
It appears that Smith was further limited by the 1966 case of Read
v. Turner."s In Read, the plaintiff builder had conceived the plans him-
self and constructed a home originally intended for his private use.
The defendant, Read's cement contractor, who had not been expressly
forbidden to copy the plans, did in fact do so and later constructed
ten homes based upon them. 9 Two of these homes were constructed
on the same block as plaintiff's. Plaintiff, however, subsequently placed
his home for sale with a broker who was one of seven hundred and
fifty broker-members of a multiple listing service. This resulted in sub-
stantial public showings of the house.60 Further, the plaintiff gave
the ultimate purchaser an "unrestricted" set of plans.61  These
acts were held to constitute a general publication of the plans.62 As
a result, plaintiff was allowed to recover only those damages suffered
prior to the acts deemed to constitute the publication. Smith was ex-
pressly distinguished on three grounds. First, it was concluded that
Smith involved a "total architectural design" as opposed to a mere
floor plan as in Read, the court taking the position that the former is not
so evident upon inspection of the completed structure as the latter.63
Second, the court noted that in Smith the creator of the design had ex-
pressly retained its ownership whereas in Read it appeared that he
gave the plans and all rights therein to the buyer of the house. 4
photographs of the new building in the corporation's annual report, and (4) failing to
mark the plans "confidential" or to take measures to assure their return.
56. See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
57. 224 Cal. App. 2d at 337, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 589. A careful reading of the
Smith opinion clearly demonstrates the erroneous nature of such an interpretation.
Although the Smith court did in fact discuss the view described in the text (174 Cal.
App. 2d at 756, 345 P.2d at 533), it expressly stated its disapproval thereof holding
that:
When an architect builds a structure, it is somewhat similar to the author pub-
lishing a book. The structure is present for the public to see. . . . IThe exterior
is copyable by anyone with sufficient draftsmanship qualities. But . . . it is not
a general publication of the detailed plans themselves. 174 Cal. App. 2d at 758,
345 P.2d at 555 (emphasis added).
58. 239 Cal. App. 2d 504, 48 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1966).
59. Id. at 507-08, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 921-22.
60. Id. at 508, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 922.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 512, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
63. Id. at 512, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 924-25.
64. Id. at 512, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
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Finally, the court pointed out that Smith involved no public showing of
the house prior to sale.6 5 Read is not as clearly a merchant-builder
case as Shanahan,66 but it is apparent that the critical fact which they
share in common is the public display for sale of the completed
house. While the dichotomy between Smith and Shanahan was ex-
treme, the difference between Read and Smith appears to lie only in
the bare display for sale. The Read court, in justifying its position,
stated that:
[A] design may be expressed by incorporating it in a structure as
well as by incorporating it in a drawing. . . . [T]he floor plan . . .
readily was observable by those to whom the exhibition was made. Such
an exhibition constituted a publication of the plan.
6 7
This appears to be diametrically opposed to the analytical principal,
enunciated in Smith, that construction of the structure does not publish
the plans,68 as well as to that enunciated in Wood, that the structure
only publishes itself-i.e., a copy of the structure is permitted so long
as the plans themselves are not copied.6 9
The effect of the above cases has been to limit the holding in Smith
to the precise facts of that case: the granting of a license of narrow
scope by one who retains all rights in the plans and design for the
building of an individual home for a particular client wherein interior
viewing is restricted to a very limited number of persons. With the
relatively minor exception of this particular fact situation, the results in
Shanahan and Read come very close to returning California to the
early traditional view of the Ku'rfiss and Gendell cases. 0
Some jurisdictions have continued to follow the more liberal approach
of Smith and Wood. In Ashworth v. Glover,'71 for example, the ar-
chitect-plaintiff had designed a drive-in restaurant for his client under
a contract which provided that the plans and copies thereof were to re-
main the property of the architect and were not to be used on any other
but the completed project.72  An employee of the client permitted the
65. Id.
66. Shanahan constructed 1,435 homes in five subdivisions from his plans during
1957-1960. 224 Cal. App. 2d at 329, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 584-585. Read built only
one house and Turner and his controlled companies constructed only ten houses from
Read's plans. 239 Cal. App. 2d at 507-08, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 921-22.
67. 239 Cal. App. 2d at 513, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
68. See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
69. See text accompanying notes 43-50 supra.
70. See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
71. 433 P.2d 315 (Utah 1967).
72. Id. at 317.
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defendant to copy the plans, from which copy the defendant proceeded to
erect a similar building on the same highway seventeen miles away.
73
Photographs of both buildings are included in the appellate reports,
74
and it is clear from the photographs that one is a copy of the other. There
are, however, enough minor dissimilarities to support an inference that
only the building was copied and not necessarily the plans. The court
permitted a recovery by the plaintiff, however, without expressly mak-
ing that distinction.75 No publication was found in the filing of the plans,
in their being put out for bids, or in the actual construction of the build-
ing.76
It is clear that the law concerning common-law copyright of architec-
tural plans is in a state of flux. While it is probable that no state
would today concur with the holding that the filing of plans with a
building department for the purpose of obtaining a permit constitutes
their publication, California and other jurisdictions following the ration-
ale of Read would, however, find publication in the construction of a
building with its subsequent exposure to the public. These same juris-
dictions would similarly hold that after construction any person could
observe, measure and copy the completed building itself without incur-
ring liability for infringement. In sum then, common law copyright, while
potentially a most effective remedy for the misappropriation of architec-
tural plans and designs, could only be of real value in those jurisdictions
which adopt and follow the reasoning of cases like Smith, Wood and
Ashworth. Unfortunately for the architect, these three cases represent a
distinctly minority view.
3. The Federal Copyright Act
The remedy presently afforded persons protected under the stat-
utory federal Copyright Act77 is more clearly defined than that afforded
73. Id.
74. Id. at 318.
75. Id. at 319; cf. Vic Alexander & Assoc. v. Cheyenne Neon Sign Co., 417
P.2d 921 (Wyo. 1966), wherein the court was faced with this same general
problem but appears to have considered it immaterial. A sign company that had
designed and constructed a large, ornate, illuminated sign for a merchant was able
to recover damages on a common law copyright theory when the merchant contracted
for another party to copy the sign for his branch store in another city. The second
sign was admittedly of such different size and proportions that it certainly was not
constructed from the plans prepared for the first sign. The court did not find it neces-
sary to consider whether the plans for the second sign were based on the plans for the
first sign or on the first sign itself, and held defendant liable.
76. 433 P.2d at 319.
77. 17 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq. (1970).
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under common law copyright, although the obstacles to effective pro-
tection are substantially greater under the Act. In order to obtain the
benefits and protection provided by the Copyright Act, it is necessary
to observe certain formalities in connection with the initial publication of
the work.78 Adherence to the statute requires that a notice of copy-
right must be placed on each plan or drawing prior to any act that
might be construed as a publication of the plans, 7 preferably before
the vellum leaves the drafting table. The notice must consist of
either the word "Copyright", the abbreviation "Copr.", or the symbol
"©", accompanied by the name of the copyright proprietor and the year
in which the copyright was secured. 80 Copyright is secured by publica-
tion with notice; however, promptly thereafter two complete copies of
the work should be sent to the Register of Copyrights together with an
affidavit of application for copyright registration."' Should publication
occur absent compliance with these notice requirements, the work
will be deemed to have been dedicated by the publication and
no curative act can thereafter recover the statutory rights lost.8 2 More-
78. See 17 U.S.C. § 10, 19-21 (1970).
79. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1970); Dejonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co., 235 U.S. 33,
36 (1914); Mifflin v. Dutton, 190 U.S. 265, 266 (1903). See also Herbert Rosenthal
Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 740-41 (9th Cir. 1971). 17 U.S.C. § 10
is to be construed both liberally and realistically to be consonant with ordinary business
practices. See Irving J. Dorfman Co. v. Borlan Industries, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 21, 24
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Acadia Co., 173 F. Supp. 292, 305
(S.D.N.Y. 1959), affd sub nom. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp.,
274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960).
80. 17 U.S.C. § 19 (1970). This section is to be liberally construed. Uneeda
Doll Co. v. Goldfarb Novelty Co., 373 F.2d 851, 854 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. dismissed,
389 U.S. 801 (1967). The purpose of the notice required by H8 10 and 19 is to af-
ford to those who might innocently infringe notice that copyright is claimed and by
whom. Glenco Refrigeration Corp. v. Raetone Commercial Refrigerator Corp., 149 F.
Supp. 691 (E.D. Pa. 1957). However, there must be substantial compliance with the
notice requirements if a copyright is to be preserved. Davis v. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 240 F. Supp. 612, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Inter-City Press, Inc. v. Sieg-
fried, 172 F. Supp. 37, 40 (W.D. Mo. 1958). See also American Code Co. v. Ben-
singer, 282 F. 829, 836 (2d Cir. 1922). But see Group Publishers v. Winchell, 86 F.
Supp. 573, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
81. 17 U.S.C. § 11, 13, 14, 15 (1970); G.P. Putnam's Sons v. Lancer Books, Inc.,
251 F. Supp. 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Fader v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 169
F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Delay, however, is not necessarily fatal, Frederick
Chusid & Co. v. Marshall Leeman & Co., 326 F. Supp. 1043, 1063-1064 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), although it does bar any recovery for infringement occurring prior to filing.
Dan Kasoff, Inc. v. Palmer Jewelry Mfg. Co., 171 F. Supp. 603, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1959);
Silvers v. Russell, 113 F. Supp. 119, 121 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
82. American Code Co. v. Bensinger, 282 F. 829, 833 (2d Cir. 1922); Davis v.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 240 F. Supp. 612, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Inter-City Press
Co. v. Siegfried, 172 F. Supp. 37, 40 (W.D. Mo. 1958); Group Publishers v.
Winchell, 86 F. Supp. 573, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). The Act does, however, provide for
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over, the publication made in the attempt to qualify the endeavor for
the statutory protection will normally constitute a sufficient publica-
tion to destroy the common law copyright theretofore enjoyed by the
creator.
8 3
It would appear from the wording of the statute that architectural
plans could, for copyright purposes, conceivably be classified under
section 5 of the Act, which affords protection to "models or designs
for works of art"'8 4 and "[d]rawings or plastic works of a scientific or
technical character."8 5  As a practical matter, however, it would mat-
ter little which classification is considered applicable since the rights
guaranteed by the Act cannot be sufficiently broadened to insure ade-
quate protection for the architect.
Section 1 of the Copyright Act lists the rights protected under the
statute:
Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this
title, shall have the exclusive right: (a) To print, publish, copy,
and vend the copyrighted work; (b) . . . to complete, execute, and
finish it if it be a model or design for a work of art .... 0
The protection afforded by section 1(a) ostensibly prevents anyone
from directly copying the plans. In order to prove copying, a party must
ordinarily show (1) actual or implied access to the thing alleged to
have been copied, (2) similarity and (3) appropriation of something
of value.8 7 Since there is no protection afforded the building itself
registering a limited class of unpublished works not reproduced for sale such as a lec-
ture or dramatic script. 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1970); King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F.
Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Unless and until the doctrine of Smith v. Paul (see text
accompanying notes 33-40 supra) is accepted, however, this provision is of no value to
the architect.
83. NiMmER, supra note 4, at § 82.
84. 17 U.S.C. § 5(g) (1970). Section 5 requires that the application for copyright
registration specify to which of several enumerated classes the work belongs, but goes
on to state, "The above specifications shall not be held to limit the subject matter of
copyright . . . nor shall any error in classification invalidate or impair the copyright
protection secured under this title."
85. 17 U.S.C. § 5(i) (1970). The regulations of the Copyright Office expressly
include "an architect's blueprint as a work registerable within this class." 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.12(a) (1972).
86. 17 U.S.C. H§ 1(a)-(b) (1970).
87. Access: Williams v. Kaag Mfrs., Inc., 338 F.2d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 1964); Blum-
craft of Pittsburgh v. Newman Bros., Inc., 373 F.2d 905, 907 (6th Cir. 1967); Bevan v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 601, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Similar-
ity: Williams v. Kaag Mfrs., Inc., supra, at 951; Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154
F.2d 480, 487 (2nd Cir. 1946). Appropriation of something of value: Bradbury v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 287 F.2d 478, 485 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. dis-
missed, 368 U.S. 801 (1962); Columbia Pictures Corp. v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co.,
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under the Act,8 8 the infringer need only allege in defense that he did
not copy the plans but rather drafted his own plans from observations
and measurements of the completed building. This would establish a
prima facie defense on the issues of access and similarity in cases in
which the building was open to public view. In fact, it is common
trade practice for merchant-builders to intensively comparison shop
each other's projects and to copy every innovation of note. Thus, al-
though the protection of section 1 (a) might be applicable to a monu-
mental project which, by its very nature, is likely to be built only once,
it is of little value to a client-related project in which the building will
be open to public view and of no utility whatsoever to the merchant-
builder because his volume and promotional efforts are likely to assure
access by large numbers of people, including his competitors. With
respect to the protection afforded under section 1 (b) (which grants
the exclusive right to execute a design for a work of art), even assuming
such protection could be said to extend to and encompass architectural
plans,8 9 it would appear at best to guarantee merely the right to make
a first construction from such plansY0 Since copying and appropriation
do not usually take place until the merits of the design are clearly evident
to third parties who have observed the completed building, such pro-
tection would be illusory.
In light of the above, it would thus appear that the only possible re-
covery under the Copyright Act would be for the convenience value
to the infringer of being able to copy the plans as opposed to having
to measure the building and draft his own plans. 1 However, even
137 F. Supp. 348, 353 (S.D. Cal. 1955); Markham v. A.E. Borden Co., 108 F. Supp.
695, 707 (D. Mass. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 206 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1953).
88. This must be inferred from the text of 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) and the filing and
registration requirements. See DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184, 195
(M.D. Fla. 1962). The author is unaware of any attempt to copyright a building, but
there is a policy of excluding items which are primarily utilitarian and not works of
art or models or designs thereof; see, e.g., Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre
Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958) (wrist watch);
Kemp & Beatley, Inc. v. Hirsch, 34 F.2d 291 (E.D.N.Y. 1929) (dress patterns); cf.
Stein v. Mazer, 204 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1953), a! 'd, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (approving
copyright of ceramic lamp bases sculpted in the form of dancing figures as works of
art).
89. See note 88 supra.
90. Cf. Green v. Luby, 177 F. 287 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909); Underhill v. Schenck,
187 N.Y.S. 589 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
91. Cf. Oakes v. Suelynn Corp., 24 Cal. App. 3d 271, 100 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1972).
The holding in Oakes is probably of general significance even though the rights as-
serted therein were based on common law rather than statutory copyright. Plaintiff-
architect had drawn plans for the conversion of a ferryboat into a restaurant. After
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this rather limited form of recovery may, in practice, prove to be
unobtainable; for the plaintiff is unlikely to have direct evidence of
copying, and proof based upon similarity is likely to be virtually im-
possible, given the availability of the building itself.
It should be readily apparent from the foregoing that the Copyright
Act, in its present form, is of little or no value with respect to the pro-
tection of architectural design. It would appear that effective protec-
tion could be achieved, however, by amending the Act to enhance
the existing protection against the actual copying of copyrighted plans
by expressly (1) reposing in the proprietor of such plans the exclusive
right to erect structures from them; and (2) legislatively overruling the
approach taken in Wood, supra, that a copy made from a structure itself
is permissible even where this results in the attainment of plans identical
to the originals.92 The result of such an amendment would be to af-
ford architectural plans protection analogous to that furnished dra-
matic works under section 1 (d) which affords the exclusive right "[t]o
perform . . . the copyrighted work publicly if it be a drama ... .
The author of a dramatic work, prior to a general publication, retains his
common law rights indefinitely since performance of the play and any
incidental publications are deemed only "'limited" publications. 4  Sec-
tion 1(d) of the Copyright Act continues this protection even after
a general publication. 5 Thus, when a printed script and stage direc-
tions are sold at a book store, for example, the sale does not carry
with it the right to use that script to perform the play." Furthermore,
the client's bankruptcy, the ferryboat was sold to defendant who converted it into an
office building. He admitted using the plaintiff's plans to determine the internal dimen-
sions and structure of the ferryboat. The court denied the architect any recovery,
holding that he had no protectable interest in the measurements of the existing struc-
ture, that there was no conversion of the plans, and no appropriation of his creative
design.
92. An express prohibition of this interpretation would have to be included to pre-
vent the district courts from following this holding of Wood and thereby negating the
effect of the first portion of the proposed amendment. The amendment would prevent
the recurrence of such holdings as that of DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F.
Supp. 184 (M.D. Fla. 1962), in which a district court not only followed Wood but went
further holding that statutory copyright does not prevent copying the building but only
forbids copying the plans, that statutory copyright does not prevent use of the plans in
the construction of a building, and that there are no "performance rights" in the ar-
chitect under the Copyright Act to build exclusively from the plans. Id. at 195.
93. 17 U.S.C. § 1(d) (1970).
94. See text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
95. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1970); see Hirshon v. United Artists Corp., 243 F.2d 640 (D.C.
Cir. 1957); Ross Products, Inc. v. New York Merchandise Co., 233 F. Supp. 260
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
96. Green v. Luby, 177 F. 287 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909); 17 U.S.C. § I(d) (1970).
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it is settled that in an infringement suit the trier of fact may find
that an adaptation from a dramatic performance is a copy even though
it differs from the original script in many important details.
The enactment of such an amendment, while conceivable, could well
face a serious impediment in the form of a well established concept
which has traditionally limited the scope of protection afforded under
the Copyright Act. This is the concept that the copyright of a book,
magazine article, play, etc., does not encompass the ideas contained
therein but only that particular expression of those ideas.0 ' In the
leading case involving this concept, Baker v. Selden, 0 plaintiff had
written and caused to be published a copyrighted book in which he
described a novel and unique accounting system which he had in-
vented.100 The defendant had written another book expounding pre-
cisely the same system and nearly duplicating the special forms published
in plaintiff's book which were requisite to the use of that system.10'
The United States Supreme Court held this to constitute no infringement
of the copyright on the ground that only the plaintiff's particular mode of
expression was protected under the Copyright Act, not the concepts
or ideas contained therein. 02 The Court found that since the use of
the nearly identical forms was required for execution of the concept by
defendant, he was entitled to actually copy them, if need be, because
to hold otherwise would effectively prevent him from presenting his own
mode of expression of the unprotected concept. 0 3  The applicability of
97. This would have to be true to support actions based on similarity such as
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2nd Cir. 1930), and Sheldon v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2nd Cir. 1936).
98. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100-01 (1880) (discussed in text accom-
panying notes 100-04 infra); Scott v. WKJG Inc., 376 F.2d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 832 (1967) ("[Clopyright protection does not extend to ideas,
plots, dramatic situations and events. Rather, it is limited to the arrangement of
words an author uses to express his ideas."); Uneeda Doll Co. v. P & M Doll Co., 353
F.2d 788, 789 (2d Cir. 1965) ("ITihere can be no copyright on an 'idea' itself but only
of the tangible 'expression' of the idea.").
99. 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
100. Id. at 100.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 104. See also Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446
F.2d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 1971); Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404, 408-409 (S.D.N.Y. 1913),
and cases cited in note 98 supra.
103. Id. at 101. See also Becker v. Loew's, Inc., 133 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 772 (1943):
The object of copyright is to promote science and the useful arts. If an author, by
originating a new arrangement and form of expression of certain ideas or con-
ceptions, could withdraw these ideas or conceptions from the stock of materials to
be used by other authors, each copyright would narrow the field of thought open for
development and exploitation. . . . Id. at 891, quoting Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F.
404, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
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the Baker v. Selden concept to copyrighted architectural plans is, at
present, uncertain. This uncertainty stems from a disagreement among
the circuits regarding the proper resolution of this precise issue.
The Sixth Circuit decision in Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Maddox' 4
presents a striking demonstration of the effects of application of the
concept to copyrighted architectural plans. The plaintiff in Scholz was
a manufacturer and seller of prefabricated homes, which he sold to
merchant-builders for resale after erection at their own job-sites.105
Plaintiff operated over a multi-state area and thus desired to circulate
the floor plan portion of the plans widely enough to establish an
effective consumer-targeted promotional campaign. Aware that this
course of conduct gave rise to serious vulnerability to unauthorized use of
his plans by both competitors in the prefabricated home business and con-
ventional job-site builders, plaintiff copyrighted both the plans them-
selves and the promotional literature in which the floor plan portion of
plans was contained.10 6 Notwithstanding these precautions, the district
court's summary judgment for the defendant-infringer was upheld on two
grounds. First, it was held that the promotional publication dedicated
the use of the plans to the public since the copyright served only to pro-
tect the arrangement and configuration of the advertising brochure as
such. 10 7  This holding, while not too clearly reasoned in the court
opinion, is apparently bottomed on Baker v. Selden.08 Second, Baker v.
Selden was cited as direct authority for the court's justification of de-
fendant's preparation of new plans, from either the brochure or
sketches made from the completed house, on the ground that the copy-
right of the plans protects only that particular configuration of lines
and marks and not the underlying concept, i.e., the house itself.10 9
Under this approach, the plans might be said to constitute a kind of
"how to do it" guide, analogous to the book in Baker v. Selden, the
house described in the plans being the concept analogous to the ac-
counting system described in the book.
In the only other federal appellate court case in which this issue has
104. 379 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1967).
105. Id. at 85. The report of the case states only that the homes were offered for
sale at builders' conventions. The facts regarding the operating procedures set forth
in the text accompanying notes 105-07 infra are based on the personal knowledge of
the author.
106. Id. at 85.
107. Id. at 87.
108. See text accompanying notes 99-103 supra.
109. 379 F.2d at 86-87.
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been decided, Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont," ° the Fifth Circuit
reached precisely the opposite result on facts nearly identical to those of
Scholz."' In Imperial, it was held, first, that plaintiff did not, by repro-
duction (in his advertising brochure) of the floor plan from the copy-
righted set of architectural drawings, waive or abandon the copyright
fight; and, second, that copying this reproduction would constitute an
infringement of such copyright right.12  With respect to the Supreme
Court's decision in Baker v. Selden, the court stated:
[T]he court [in Baker] was concerned that copyright privileges might
result in vesting exclusive use rights which only a patent could confer.
We therefore interpret this decision as holding that a descriptive copy-
right may not extend an exclusive right to the use of the described art
itself lest originality of description should preempt non-novel invention.
Thus, no copyrighted architectural plans under § 5 (i) may clothe their
author with the exclusive right to reproduce the dwelling pictured.
However, nothing in Baker v. Selden prevents such a copyright from
vesting the law's grant of an exclusive right to make copies of the copy-
righted plans so as to instruct a would be builder on how to proceed to
construct the dwelling pictured.11
3
110. 458 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1972).
111. In Imperial, plaintiff, a merchant-builder as in Sclolz, developed and copy-
righted architectural plans for a specific style of residence. 458 F.2d at 896. Subse-
quently, model homes were constructed according to the design and opened to the
public. Id. In addition, plaintiff prepared and distributed an advertising brochure
containing only the floor plan from the complete set of architectural drawings. Id.
The brochure itself was not copyrighted; however, it did state that plaintiff claimed
a copyright on the floor plan exhibited therein. Id. Defendants visited plaintiff's model
homes, obtained a copy of the brochure, and proceeded to develop a set of drawings
illustrating the manner of constructing a residential dwelling intended to be substantially
similar to that designed by the plaintiff. Id. at 897. The trial court found as a fact
that defendants had not copied the full set of plaintiff's copyrighted plans in developing
their own drawings; however, no finding was made as to whether defendants copied
the floor plan exhibited in the brochure, Id.
112. 458 F.2d 895 at 897. The case was remanded for a finding on the issue of
whether defendants in fact copied the floor plan exhibited in the brochure, or based
their drawings only on observations and measurements of the model homes.
113. Id. at 899. The Fifth Circuit did not discuss the relevancy, if any, of the
Supreme Court's holding in Baker v. Selden that, since the use of forms nearly identical
to those used by plaintiff was required for execution of the concept by the defendant,
he was entitled to actually copy them, if need be, because to hold otherwise would
effectively prevent him from presenting his own mode of expression of the unprotected
concept. 101 U.S. at 101. It would seem, however, that the actual copying of the
original plans would not be necessary for another to put forth his own expression of
the underlying concept (i.e., the design) embodied in such plans. This lack of neces-
sity is due to the fact that one wishing to reproduce a completed structure in the
architectural area is free to observe, measure and make his own plans from the
structure itself. See text accompanying note 49 supra and note 115 infra.
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Thus, in the Fifth Circuit's view, the Baker v. Selden concept has no
applicability to copyrighted architectural plans. Under this view, while
the plans might still be said to constitute a kind of "how to do it" (i.e.,
how to create the architectural concept embodied within them) guide,
they do not constitute the only such guide and are on this ground clearly
distinguishable from the book in Baker."4
It is clear from the above that while the circuits agree that the
copyrighting of architectural plans does not prevent anyone from re-
producing the concept (design) embodied therein,1" 5 the existing deci-
sions are in direct conflict as to the effect of a copyright on future re-
production of the plans themselves. Thus, any legislative expansion,
along the lines suggested above, of the protection presently afforded un-
der the Copyright Act will depend to a very great extent upon the view
which Congress ultimately adopts with respect to the applicability of the
Baker v. Selden concept to architectural plans.
4. The Patent Act
In light of the denial of effective protection under the Copyright Act,
the architect might logically seek refuge under the provisions of the
Patent Act."' However, as will be demonstrated immediately below,
there exists constraints which similarly hinder effective use of that statute
for the protection of the architect's product.
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof, may obtain a patent therefor .... 117
While it is clear that a device used in the construction of a house can
be patented and its unlicensed use prevented, 1 8 it is equally clear
that an entire house itself would probably not be considered sufficiently
novel to qualify for the issuance of a patent under this section since
114. See text accompanying notes 109-110 supra.
115. See text accompanying notes 107-09, 113 supra.
116. 35 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq. (1970).
117. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970); see, e.g., United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S.
241, 250 (1942).
118. ". . . Congress meant to be comprehensive and inclusive in patent coverage
and liberal in patent protection, provided 'any person' either invent or discover-a new
and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. It meant to cover
all inventions and discoveries which were new and useful." Dennis v. Pitner, 106
F.2d 142, 146 (7th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 606 (1939). 35 U.S.C. § 283
(1970) provides that a patent proprietor may obtain an injunction to prevent the
violation of his patent rights. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1970) provides for damages for patent
infringement.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
nearly all houses have many features in common, even if designed by
an exceptional architect. 119 The question remains, however, whether
the architect might avail himself of the protection of those provi-
sions of the Act creating a special category of patent, the design patent.
Section 171 provides:
Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an arti-
cle of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the condi-
tions and requirements of this title.
The provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall ap-
ply to patents for designs, except as otherwise provided. 120
Thus a dress designer can patent a given dress design under a design
patent without having to patent the idea of the dress itself as a garment.
Design patents may be issued for periods of up to fourteen years;121
however, the general patent requirements of novelty, non-obviousness,
originality and ornamentality must still be complied with.1
22
Generally, the test applied to determine novelty in design patents
has been that the design must, in the eyes of the average observer,
appear to be new and not a modification of an already existing de-
sign.' 23  Under this test, if another design, already part of the public
domain, includes the applicant's design, he is not entitled to a patent on
the ground that the "device" was already in public use prior to his
"invention" of it.' 24  Even when an applicant's design satisfies the
requirement of novelty, it may still be rejected for obviousness. 2r The
test here is whether the design would have been obvious at the time of
119. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970) provides: "A patent may not be obtained . . . if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time of the invention
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. .. ."
See R.M. Palmer Co. v. Luden's, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 672 (E.D. Pa. 1955), modified,
236 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1956); cf. Vulcan Corp. v. Slipper City Wood Heel Co., 89
F.2d 109 (6th Cir. 1937); Weidhaas v. Loew's Inc., 125 F.2d 544 (2nd Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 316 U.S. 684 (1942), rehearing denied, 317 U.S. 705 (1942).
120. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1970); see Application of Krueger, 208 F.2d 482 (C.C.P.A.
1953); Philco Corp. v. Admiral Corp., 199 F. Supp. 797 (D. Del. 1961).
121. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1970).
122. As provided in 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 (1970) (novelty), 103 (non-obviousness), and
171 (originality, ornamentality). See Rains v. Cascade Industries, Inc., 402 F.2d
241 (3d Cir. 1968); Barofsky v. General Elec. Corp., 396 F.2d 340 (9th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1031.
123. Application of Johnson, 175 F.2d 791, 792 (C.C.P.A. 1949); cf. Patriarca Mfg.,
Inc. v. Sosnick, 278 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1960).
124. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1970); see Carboline Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 301 F.
Supp. 141 (N.D. IIl. 1969).
125. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970); see R.M. Palmer Co. v. Luden's Inc., 128 F. Supp.
672 (E.D. Pa. 1955), modified, 236 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1956).
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invention to one having "ordinary skill" in the art.126  In addition to its
being novel and non-obvious, the design must be original,' 27  Here the
term is used much more narrowly than under copyright law, 28 and
generally requires that the inventor-designer have exercised inventive
genius.' 20  Finally, it is required that the design be ornamental; that
is, it must have a pleasing aesthetic appearance 30 and its principal
purpose cannot be mechanical or utilitarian.' 31
The procedure involved in obtaining a design patent is far more
complex and is likely to be much more costly than that involved in
obtaining a copyright. 132  The application must include drawings of
the design claimed, a specification describing the drawings, and a claim
of the design, 83 all of which are necessary for the Patent Office to
evaluate the design against the requirements of the Act. In addition,
there will usually be extensive correspondence, advocacy and negotiation
between the applicant and the Patent Office 34 for which the services of
a patent attorney will normally be required.'3 5
126. Id. "Ordinary skill" is a question of fact. In order for a new combination of
elements to be patentable it is necessary that a person skilled in the art would not
have been able to arrive at the new combination without the exercise of "inventive
faculty." Application of Carter, 212 F.2d 189, 192 (C.C.P.A. 1954). In Abbott v. Coe,
109 F.2d 449, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1939) the court stated that "useful innovation is
not patentable, and that innovation is not invention unless it required some uncommon
talent." (emphasis added).
127. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1970). The statute does not use the word "original" per se
but by its provisions clearly sets forth a narrow and precise definition thereof.
128. See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
129. R.M. Palmer Co. v. Luden's, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 672 (E.D. Pa. 1955), modified,
236 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1956); Avery v. Ever Ready Label Corp., 104 F. Supp. 913 (D.
N.J. 1952).
130. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1970); Rains v. Cascade Industries, Inc., 402 F.2d 241, 247
(3d Cir. 1968). See also Design, Inc. v. Emerson Co., 319 F. Supp. 8, 9 (S.D. Tex.
1970).
131. See, e.g., Application of Weil, 201 F.2d 946 (C.C.P.A. 1953) (a design patent
cannot be granted for the protection of mere utilitarian advantages over the prior art);
Weisgerber v. Clowney, 131 F. 477 (D.NJ. 1904) (while an item may be useful as
well as ornamental, a design patent cannot cover mere mechanical function or construc-
tion).
132. 35 U.S.C. § 1-99 (1970) cover the operation of the patent office. 35 U.S.C.
§ 100-104 cover patentability. 35 U.S.C. § 111-46 (1970) cover application for
patents, examination of applications, and the procedure for review of patent office de-
cisions. For the procedures for obtaining a copyright see text accompanying notes
77-81 supra.
133. 37 C.F.R. § 1.151, 1.152, 1.71-1.77, 1.81-1.88 (1972).
134. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.2, 1.104, 1.111, 1.112 (1972).
135. See 37 C.F.R. H§ 1.341-1.348 (1972) for rules pertaining to recognition of
patent attorneys and patent agents permitted to represent applicants for patents. A
"patent agent" need not be a member of the bar and an applicant may represent him-
self. 37 C.F.R. § 1.31, 1.33 (1972).
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A design patent grants broader exclusive rights to the patent holder
than do the copyright statutes to the copyright holder. Initially, these
rights are free from the Baker v. Selden restrictions.'"0 Further,
the holder of a design patent has the exclusive right to make, use or sell
his design.' 37 The protection is thus in the design itself and there-
fore extends to the appearance of the structure as opposed to merely the
plans or drawings from which it was created.13 8  As pointed out above,
this is the precise protection which the architect desires. Apparently,
however, not many builders or architects have elected to seek design
patents for their product, a fact attested to by the dearth of reported
cases on the patenting of architectural designs. The lack of attempted
utilization of this potential and seemingly well-suited remedy is prob-
ably explainable on two grounds. First, it may not be possible in
a given case to obtain a design patent covering certain of the features
for which protection is desired due to the stringency of the novelty,
originality, ornamentality and non-obviousness requirements. Sec-
ond, any patent which ultimately does issue will come only after the ex-
penditure of considerable time, effort and expense. Thus, while use
of the design patent is not totally prevented and the protection af-
forded thereunder, if achieved, would provide the architect or builder
with substantially the type of protection he desires, the practical im-
pediments to the achievement of such protection seriously hinder ef-
fective use of the Act for protection against the appropriation of archi-
tectural design.
5. Unfair Competition
Although it has been rarely utilized in the context here under con-
sideration, the common-law tort action of unfair competition would
appear to constitute the most promising potential remedy for misap-
propriation of architectural design. The remedy is based on equitable
principles, would require little or no preparation by the architect prior to
an infringement, and has been enormously expanded into an extremely
effective tool in recent years. 13 9
136. See text accompanying notes 99-103 supra.
137. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1970) (listing prohibited actions constituting patent in-
fringement).
138. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1970). See also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879);
Hadco Products, Inc. v. Lighting Corp. of America, 312 F. Supp. 1173, 1185 (E.D. Pa.
1970) (general appearance rather than minute detail constitutes substance of design
patent, and its limitation, the infringement).
139. See Green, Protection of Trade Relations Under Tort Law, 47 VA. L. Rnv. 559
(1961) [hereinafter cited as Green].
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Society has elected to regard certain business practices as beyond
the permitted scope of competitive spirit and to designate these prac-
tices tortious acts. Such practices include "palming off,"' 4 ° plagiar-
ism,14' and misappropriation. 142  While both "palming off" and
plagiarism could readily occur with respect to the use of architectural
design, the particular manifestation of unfair competition which is most
important in connection with the topic presently under discussion is, of
course, misappropriation.
The leading case in this area is International News Service v. Associ-
ated Press,4 ' wherein Associated Press, [hereinafter A.P.] which
gathered news and transmitted it by telegraph and messenger to news-
papers throughout the United States,' 4 sought to enjoin International
News Service [hereinafter I.N.S.] from placing agents at major east
coast newspaper offices for the purpose of copying news as it was
written upon bulletin boards placed in the ground floor show windows
of each newspaper's offices and from the published papers themselves.' 45
It was alleged that this material, some rewritten and some taken ver-
batim, was transmitted by telegraph to newspapers in the more westerly
time zones, in time for its use in preparation of their own editions. 46
As a result, I.N.S. was able to offer its service at a discount price. 4
Since the material in question was news which, apart from being a spe-
cial and extraordinary means of expression, cannot normally be the
subject of copyright, 48 and because A.P. did not in any event attempt
to copyright its dispatches, the question of copyright was in no way an
issue in the case.' 49 The Supreme Court, in enjoining I.N.S. from using
any material acquired in the described manner "until its commer-
cial value as news to the complainant and all of its members [subscrib-
140. "Palming off" is an attempt by one person to induce customers to believe his
products are of a certain type or manufacturer which they are not. See Pic Design
Corp. v. Bearings Specialty Co., 436 F.2d 804, 807 (1st Cir. 1971); Green, supra note
139, at 566.
141. "Plagiarism" is the appropriation of a literary composition of another and a
subsequent attempt to induce others to believe it is one's own creation. Tamas v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 25 N.Y.S.2d 899, 900 (Sup. Ct. 1941). See also
Green, supra note 139, at 566.
142. The balance of this section of the Comment will involve discussion of the
practice of misappropriation.
143. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
144. Id. at 229.
145. Id. at 231-32.
146. Id. at 238.
147. Id. at 240.
148. Id. at 233-34.
149. Id. at 234-35.
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ers] has passed away,"'150 reasoned that:
[T]he case must turn upon the question of unfair competition in busi-
ness. And, in our opinion, this does not depend upon any general right
of property analogous to the common-law right of the proprietor of an
unpublished work to prevent its publication without his consent; nor is it
foreclosed by showing that the benefits of the copyright act have been
waived . 151
The Court continued:
In [following the described course of conduct] defendant . . . admits
that it is taking material that has been acquired by complainant as the
result of . . . the expenditure of labor, skill, and money, and . . .
that defendant is . . . endeavoring to reap where it has not sown, and
. . . is appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have sown.' "2
The foundation laid by this opinion proceeded to flourish and ma-
ture into a readily accessible and effective remedy for misappropriation.
In 1964, however, effective use of the doctrine appeared to come to
an abrupt end with the Supreme Court's decisions in Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel' 53 and Compco Corp. v. Day Bright Lighting, Inc.1
4
These were companion cases in which the Court held in favor of the de-
fendants, alleged infringers of design patents.' 55 In each case a de-
sign patent was found to have been invalid; however, the trial courts
each permitted plaintiffs a remedy under the cloak of unfair competi-
tion., The Supreme Court held this to be prohibited state action in
an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction.15 7  The Court stated its pre-
cise holding as follows:
Today we have held . . . that when an article is unprotected by a patent
or a copyright, state law may not forbid others to copy that article. To
forbid copying would interfere with the federal policy, found in Article I,
Sec. 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing federal stat-
utes, of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and
copyright laws leave in the public domain. 58
The Court reasoned that were it to hold otherwise:
States could allow perpetual protection to articles too lacking in novelty
150. Id. at 245.
151. Id. at 235.
152. Id. at 239.
153. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
154. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
155. Id. at 232-33, 238-39.
156. Id. at 226, 235.
157. Id. at 232-33, 237.
158. Id. at 237 (emphasis added).
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to merit any patent at all under federal . . . standards. 159
At first blush, it would appear that these cases in effect overruled
International News Service v. Associated Press and indeed there exist
cases so holding.' 60 The conclusion of such cases is that the states are
precluded from application of either common law or statutory unfair
competition remedies to copying or misappropriation of subject matter
which is neither patented nor copyrighted."6' However, strong authority
also exists for the view that Sears and Compco merely ban state action
against actual copying, which is permitted under federal law absent a val-
id patent or copyright. 162  Under this view, those cases do not touch
on the question of appropriation (i.e., reaping where one has not sown),
and therefore in no way affect the legality of state action with respect
to that question.
The cases upholding the legality of state unfair competition remedies,
in effect, continue to draw a distinction relied upon by courts even
before the Sears and Compco decisions. This is the distinction between
mere copying of an unprotected work, conduct which was held not
actionable, and copying which permits the copier to take advan-
tage of a competitor's prior expenditure of time, money or effort and
turn it to his own competitive advantage to the detriment of his com-
petitor, conduct which was held actionable. The application of this dis-
tinction is best ilusrated by the decision of the New York Court of Ap-
peals in Hebrew Publishing Co. v. Scharfstein,1 3 a case decided long be-
fore Sears and Compco. In Scharfstein, plaintiff printed and marketed a
Jewish prayerbook. Defendant, a bookseller who retailed copies of the
book, had offset plates made from photographs of its pages and there-
after printed and sold his own edition.' 64  The content of the prayer-
159. Id. at 232.
160. See, e.g., C.B.S. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1007 (1967).
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Tape Industries Ass'n of America v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340
(C.D. Cal. 1970), dismissed, 401 U.S. 902 (1971), wherein state laws against the unau-
thorized manufacture for sale of tape recordings from the original publisher's disc records
or tape were upheld even though the material copied could not then be copyrighted.
The court relied on Water Services, Inc. v. Tesco Chemicals, Inc., 410 F.2d 163
(5th Cir. 1969), and Grove Press v. Collectors Publication, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 603
(C.D. Cal. 1967) (discussed in note 167 infra). See also Liberty/United Artists,
Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp., 180 S.E.2d 414 (N.C. App. 1971); Capital Records, Inc.
v. Spies, 264 N.E.2d 874 (Ill. 1970); Capital Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App.
3d 526, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1969); Capital Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc.,
252 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
163. 288 N.Y. 374, 43 N.E.2d 449 (1942).
164. Id. at -, 43 N.E.2d at 450.
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book being clearly in the public domain, the suit was brought on
the grounds of unfair competition.""5 It appeared, however, that plaintiff
had acquired his plates in a manner similar to defendant by photo-
graphing the pages of older prayerbooks printed in Europe."' De-
fendant prevailed, the court in effect reasoning that plaintiff had not
"sown," therefore defendant was not "harvesting another's crop," al-
though he was certainly copying.161
It is the opinion of this author that the better reasoned cases are
those upholding the legality of state remedies for unfair competition.
The language used by the Supreme Court itself in describing its hold-
ings in the Sears and Compco decisions clearly appears to be directed
expressly towards the act of copying: "[Wihen an article is unprotected
by a patent or a copyright, state law may not forbid others to copy that
article."' 8  This language says nothing whatsoever about the right of
state law to forbid later use of the copied material to the competitive
advantage of the copier and competitive disadvantage of the original
creator or proprietor. Further, the allowance of state court actions for
misappropriation as distinguished from mere copying would in no way
.. .interfere with the federal policy, found in Article I, Sec. 8, Cl. 8,
of the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of allowing
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. For examples of post Sears and Compco decisions which continue to draw
this distinction and apply International News Service v. Associated Press, see cases
cited in note 162 supra and especially Grove Press, Inc. v. Collectors Publication, Inc.,
264 F. Supp. 603 (C.D. Cal. 1967), which expressly distinguishes Sears and Compco,
clearly underscoring the line of demarcation between those fact situations to which
International News Service should be held to apply and those to which it should
not. In Grove Press, plaintiff had taken a manuscript that was in the public domain
but long out of print, edited it, and proceeded to publish it. The defendant later
published the same work by photolithography, copying the Grove Press edition. Later,
defendant sent its own experts to research the original manuscript and annotate its first
edition, in effect reversing the changes made by Grove's editors. In so doing, it was de-
fendant's intention to re-edit the recreated original, thereby coming up with their own
"modernized" version. This was ultimately published as defendant's second edition.
The court held that defendant's first edition constituted a misappropriation of plain-
tiff's efforts because it took advantage of Grove's editorial work, at no expense to de-
fendant, for the purpose of competing with Grove. With respect to the second edition,
however, the court found no misappropriation because, although it too originally
stemmed from a copy of plaintiff's edition, defendant was not taking any advantage
of plaintiff's efforts as it had in its first edition because it was here utilizing its own
editorial efforts. Accordingly, the court issued an injunction against defendant's first
edition only, distinguishing Sears and Compco by noting that the first edition involved
not a mere copying but a misappropriation and concluding that the Supreme Court had
not intended to deprive the states of their jurisdiction over unfair competition.
168. 376 U.S. at 237 (emphasis added).
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free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave
in the domain.' 6
9
For, again, such actions do not militate against copying per se but only
against subsequent use of the copied material and then only in those
instances in which such use is both to the competitive advantage of
the copier and competitive disadvantage of the originator.
It seems clear that in those jurisdictions which continue to allow
state court actions for misappropriation, the availability of such a cause
of action could be of great value to the architect or builder as both a
preventative of and remedy for the misappropriation of architectural
design. The architect or builder has, of course, expended time, money
and effort in the creation and development of the design itself or the
legal acquisition of rights therein. In the merchant-builder situation,
the competitor who takes advantage of such expenditure and, by
copying either the plans or completed structure, obtains the use of
this design without a like expenditure in order to compete to the detri-
ment of the creator or proprietor should be liable for his misappropri-
ation just like the misappropriating book publisher170 or recording tape
"pirate."'' This reasoning is similarly applicable to situations in
which another architect or building designer misappropriates a design
made for a client-related project.
The same reasoning would not apply, however, when the appropri-
ator is one not in competition with the originator or proprietor of the
design, as where an architect designs a restaurant for client A which is
copied and used by restauranteur B. In such a situation, client A can
seek relief under the "unfair competition" theory on the ground that for
the price of his meals he is also selling the amenity of the architect-
designed environment and that restauranteur B has misappropriated the
design of this environment from A without cost and to A's competitive
detriment.Y12  The architect in such a situation could not sue under the
above reasoning because the appropriator would gain no competitive ad-
vantage vis-a-vis the architect. The architect does, nonetheless, suf-
169. Id. (emphasis added).
170. See, e.g., Grove Press, Inc. v. Collectors Publication, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 603
(C.D. Cal. 1967), discussed in note 167 supra.
171. See, e.g., Tape Industries Ass'n of America v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340 (C.D.
Cal. 1970); Liberty/United Artists, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp., 180 S.E.2d 414 (N.C.
App. 1971). See also Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp.,
101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), afr'd, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (App. Div. 1951).
172. See text accompanying notes 144-152 supra.
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fer injury by the conduct of restauranteur B. If the architect cannot
prevent B from copying the design, he loses the valuable right of be-
ing able to offer an exclusive design. Recognition and protection of
such a right has been afforded in at least one case. In Metropolitan
Opera Association v. Wagner-Nichols Recording Co.,178 plaintiff broad-
cast live operatic performances and sold an exclusive license to Capitol
Records to make and sell records of the broadcast performance.Y
Defendant was unfairly competing with plaintiff's licensee by making
unauthorized recordings for sale.'7 5  Plaintiff's right to recovery was
upheld on the theory that the infringement reduced the value of plain-
tiffs right to name an exclusive licensee.
176
CONCLUSION
This comment has shown the following with respect to the protec-
tion of architectural design and the availability of potential remedies
for the misappropriation thereof:
1. The architect can most easily protect himself from the unauthor-
ized use of his work, both plans and design, by his client by ex-
press provision in the architect-client contract. Such contractual
provisions, however, provide no effective protection for either
the architect or his client against misappropriating third parties.
2. The architect (and perhaps a builder as his assignee) has a
common law right to the exclusive use of his plans prior to pub-
lication and may sue an appropriator for infringement, at least
in those jurisdictions which, when no other facts exist which
might be said to evidence an intent to dedicate to the public,
will not find publication in either the required filing of plans
with the appropriate authorities, the construction of the building,
or its display for use or sale. This remedy will tend to be most
available with respect to the custom home, less so with respect
to a custom commercial building, and least available in the
merchant-builder situation. This remedy is also subject to the
defense, in many jurisdictions, that it was the building itself
which the appropriator copied, not the plans.
3. There would appear to be little, if any, protection afforded
architectural design under the present provisions of the Copyright
173. 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), a!f'd, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (App. Div. 1951).
174. Id. at 486-87.
175. Id. at 487-88.
176. Id. at 499.
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Act. Further, amendment of the Act to provide effective protec-
tion will likely depend upon the view which Congress ultimately
adopts with respect to the applicability to architectural plans of
the concept that the copyright of a given entity does not en-
compass the concept or ideas contained therein but only that par-
ticular expression or manifestation of those ideas.
4. The conceptual difficulties involved in satisfying the require-
ments of the Patent Act to obtain a design patent of a building
plan seriously hinder the acquisition of this form of protection
except in the extreme case of a very unusual or distinctive de-
sign. In addition, serious practical impediments to the acquisi-
tion of such protection exist, as the patenting process itself tends
to be time consuming and expensive.
5. Assuming the view which upholds the continuing legality of state
remedies for the misappropriation aspect of unfair competition
ultimately prevails, such remedies should provide effective and
readily available protection for (a) the architect against the ap-
propriation of his design by another architect, and (b) the client
against the use of a custom commercial design by a competitor.
The protection afforded by this remedy could be even more ef-
fective if more jurisdictions would follow the view, apparently
adopted by the New York courts,1 7 which recognizes the ar-
chitect's interest in being able to prevent third parties from ap-
propriating his design, thereby depriving him of any value to be
derived from the right to offer an exclusive design.
It is thus clear that, at present, the only potentially useful remedies of
those discussed above are the doctrines of common law copyright and un-
fair competition, both of which are creatures of state common or stat-
utory law. At present, however, the effectiveness of even these rem-
edies depends to a great extent on the jurisdiction in which protection
is sought and the continued forbearance of the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari in such cases. The architect may take heart, however,
in the fact that the trend of decisions in these areas appears, with the ex-
ception of recent California decisions, to be towards increased pro-
tection of the architect's work product. Nonetheless, the architect
continues to occupy a much less favored position than that of his creative
counterparts, the author, artist, composer, or playwright.
Joseph M. Cahn
177. See text accompanying notes 173-176 supra.
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